Moral courage in the workplace: moving to and from the desire and decision to act by Sekerka, Leslie E. & Bagozzi, Richard P.
Moral courage in the workplace:
moving to and from the desire
and decision to act
Leslie E.SekerkaandRichard P.Bagozzin
Agere sequitur esse – St. Thomas Aquinas
(Action flows from being).
Vaughan (1874)
Introduction
Why is moral courage in the workplace viewed as
the unusual, rather than the norm? If we want to
cultivate organizational environments that exhibit
moral strength, we must consider how courage
can be exercised in daily organizational life, as
an action that can be achieved by everyone. To
explore this notion, we see a need to develop
additional understanding of how people deter-
mine whether or not they will act in a morally
courageous way when faced with an ethical
challenge. While existing theory sheds light on
various aspects of ethical decision making, miss-
ing from the literature is an examination of how
emotions, automatic responses to situational con-
ditions, along with conscious and deliberative
thought, work together to help guide this process.
Yet to be fully explored are the internal factors
and the social influences that accompany them,
specifically those that contribute to forming the
desire and decision to act with moral courage. We
argue that scholarship designed to explain how
this process unfolds will reshape our understand-
ing of moral courage as an action open to
self-control, and thus can occur more frequently
than the rare event it is often presumed to be.
Our depiction of the organizational member’s
response to an ethical challenge helps take moral
courage out of the extraordinary and into the
realm of what can be achieved by most people, at
least some of the time.
Leading scholars in the area of ethical decision
making have put forth an invitation to integrate
constructs, topics and issues that span academic
fields, taking a cross-disciplinary approach (Payne
& Giacalone 1990, Treviño 1992). We accept this
call and propose a process orientation to the study
of moral conduct, one that is grounded in the
behavioural sciences but mindful of philosophical
contributions. Considering the recent focus on
positive organizational scholarship (Cameron
et al. 2003), we also show how moral courage
can be better understood, encouraged and taught,
by learning what contributes to organizational
moral flourishing. If organizational members are
expected to conduct themselves with exemplary
standards of ethical behaviour, it is the responsi-
bility of scholars and managers to provide clarity
on how to do so effectively. To address this con-
cern we ask, What induces people to act in morally
courageous ways as they face an ethical challenge
in the workplace? Our starting assumption is that
moral courage can be realized and achieved by
most organizational members, under certain
personal and situational conditions. To build
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our argument we bring together ideas from ethics,
organizational behaviour, philosophy and psy-
chology to understand how individuals act in
morally courageous ways as a matter of choice
and self-control.
We present a path model (see Figure 1) to depict
how affect and cognitions influence choices in
higher order decision-making process, where
choices are self-controlled and consciously directed.
In so doing, we introduce a self-regulatory variable,
moving us beyond the largely deterministic char-
acteristics of contemporary models of decision
making to encompass aspects of free-will. The
theory we develop emphasizes personal choice
as central. When an organizational member faces
an ethical challenge, referred to by Rest (1986) as
recognition of a moral issue, we claim that indi-
viduals’ experience of different emotions and how
they think about competing pressures can lead to
their reasons to act – or not to act. This manifests
initially as a felt desire to respond in a specific way.
The development of a desire to act with moral
courage is influenced by personal factors that are, in
turn, dependent upon social forces such as organi-
zational directives, social norms, perceived rewards
or punishments, social pressure, and other situa-
tional and contextual factors. We agree with
Rorty’s (1986, 1988) concern in that the individual
must garner the willingness to act as they proceed
towards potential engagement and then throughout
their decision-making process.
Once a desire to act emerges, the individual is
capable of reflecting upon his/her desire to act.
We expect that this involves a higher-order
decision-making process, as the person decides
whether or not to continue to form and bolster
this desire, and to act (or not act) on it. Our belief
is that this self-regulatory process is governed by
an appraisal of whether acting (or not acting) is
consistent with the type of person the individual is
or wants to be. While similar to features set forth
by Jones & Verstegen Ryan (1997) in their theory
of moral approbation, our approach differs in
that we propose that first-order desires to act are
separate from and precede the moral commitment
to act (Rest 1986), which itself is governed by
second-order desires or personal moral standards.
The theory we present suggests that before the
formulation of a moral commitment, those who
are morally courageous are likely to consider
whether or not their actions will contribute to
personal and organizational flourishing. We show
how anticipated emotions, personal values, traits
and virtues, along with self-conscious emotions
and social identity processes, influence this early
appraisal process. Critical to our model is the idea
that higher-order decision-making processes
are choices. Yet the decisions that the person
makes are shaped by their social identity and
self-conscious emotions, as well as by the social
influences behind them. This constitutes a fresh
view, one that expands our limited understand-
ing of moral courage and complements earlier
approaches to ethical decision making. This work
adds value to existing models of ethical decision
making (cf. Ferrell & Gresham 1985, Hunt &
Vitell 1986, Rest 1986, Treviño 1986, Fritzsche
1991) as we examine the formation of desire and
target moral courage as the ultimate action.
We begin our work with a definition of moral
courage and then present factors that are expected
to influence an individual’s desire to act. This
includes a consideration of how anticipated
emotions may be influential, along with constructs
such as subjective and group norms, self-efficacy
and outcome expectancies. We introduce the
construct of affect towards the means, describing
how sentiments towards morally courageous ac-
tion may bear an impact. Once the desire to act is
established, we explain how self-regulation, both
automatic and conscious, may influence move-
ment towards the actual decision to act. In all,
eight formal propositions are presented to explain
how each of these factors (labelled a–i in Figure 2)
can influence the progression towards morally
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Figure 1: The path of moral courage: from ethical challenge to action
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vening) processes and moderating effects (i.e.
contingencies that augment or attenuate) are
discussed in sequence. Variables (A–D) shown in
the combined box in Figure 2 reflect initial discrete
responses to an ethical challenge. They function as
instigators of the desire to act. While it is beyond
the scope of this study to discuss how these
variables interrelate, we note that three of these
factors (self-efficacy, outcome expectancies, and
affect towards the means of goal attainment)
combine in a self-reinforcing way to influence the
desire to act in a morally courageous manner (see
Proposition 4 below). In this study, we specifically
identify what may induce the desire to act (a first-
order response) and what may impact the promo-
tion of that desire (a second-order reflection). Our
goal is to help explain how every organizational
member faces personal choices that promote or
curtail their desire to act, as they consider move-
ment towards an act of moral courage.
Moral courage
Moral behaviour denotes the presence of princi-
ples that define right action (Davis & Frederick
1984). Aristotle (350BC) suggested that courage is
both an end and a means in creating comprehen-
sive good (1999: NE 2.6.1103). Our focus is on the
internal influences (the means) associated with an
individual’s reactions, as well as personal ends,
such as applying moral standards, as the person
moves towards morally courageous action in the
workplace. From Aristotelian philosophy we see
moral behaviour evolving as a result of setting
goals and making choices, or decisions, and
establishing moral habits. But, as Aristotle
informed us long ago, the first principle of action
is not its goal, but rational choice. This work
considers how rational choice is based upon desire
and goal-directed reason.
Before we begin our description of the decision-
making process, we must define the desired end
state: moral courage. The Oxford English Dic-
tionary notes that the first word, moral, is derived
from its Latin root mor, which means custom,
habit, routine or practice. Thus, moral persons
are those who habitually make judgements
regarding the goodness or badness of an action.
Individuals make these determinations based on
what is good for others and one’s relation to












































Figure 2: Factors that influence movement to and from the desire and decision to act
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respect for them. To do this, the individual
chooses to conform to the standards of right
behaviour as guided by their character and
conscience and additionally influenced more by
subjective rather than tangible criteria in their
decision making. Therefore, to be moral one is
guided to judgement based upon convictions of
what is considered right, rather than acting only
on physical evidence or consequences, or in
response to deterministic pressures of one sort
or another. The second word, courage, reflects the
state or quality of mind or spirit that enables one
to face danger, fear or vicissitudes with self-
possession, confidence and resolution. Courage
suggests strength of character demonstrated in an
act of bravery, in the sense that the person is
willing to overcome the threat of harm to self in
pursuit of right action. According to the Oxford
English Dictionary its root is from the Latin word
cor, meaning heart.
Taken together, acts of moral courage are
derived from habits of the heart, which can be
facilitated by personal volition and self-regula-
tion. Our picture of a morally courageous person
is therefore someone who consistently makes
decisions in the light of what is good for others,
despite personal risk. Cavanagh & Moberg (1999)
suggest that this entails the consideration of right
and wrong with a conscious choice for moral
good. But moral courage is not merely an
automatic behaviour per se; it is a practice,
consistently doing what one knows one ought to
do (Solomon 1999). This is central to human
flourishing (Miller 2005) because, as individuals
struggle with their desires and reasoning, sus-
tained fortitude helps them to overcome their own
internal strife. Moral courage is a consistent
practice of having the virtue of willpower.
Moreover, the person is not motivated by other
than virtuous ends, because their motives are
based solely upon substantive virtues.
In summary, we define moral courage as the
ability to use inner principles to do what is good
for others, regardless of threat to self, as a matter
of practice. We believe that this involves the
conscious reflection on one’s desires to act, or the
lack of such a desire thereof, as one moves
towards engagement. We argue that how a person
goes about resolving the conflicts between their
desires and personal standards is what ultimately
leads to a decision to engage in morally coura-
geous behaviour. To explicate our view, we focus
on these self-regulatory processes, which are
called into play when one faces an ethical
challenge. But before we move on to describe
the cognitive influencers, we expect that indivi-
duals are likely to have an emotional response.
Thus, we first explore how affect may influence
the desire to proceed.
From emotions to desire
Aristotle left us with some uncertainty about the
function of emotion in exercising moral behaviour.
He did provide clues, however, suggesting that a
person’s ability to be courageous occurs because the
‘spirit operates in them’ (1999: NE 7.8.1116).
Moreover, his account of true courage describes it
as perfect harmony between body and soul (Ward
2001). Regardless of his ambiguity, we see threads
within his treatise to suggest the presence of affective
influence in the expression of moral courage.
Aristotle laid the foundation for a theory of moral
courage based on emotion when he grounded his
work in the concept of virtue and vice, with
concerns for pleasure seeking and pain avoidance
(1999: NE 2.1.1104, 7.11.1152, 10.1.1172).
Szagun (1992) describes courage as an emotion-
related mental construct. Taking his lead, we
begin by examining the influence of one’s affective
experiences early in the decision-making process.
Researchers who describe how people form goals
and plans for action typically depict the process as
one where people first appraise possible courses of
action and then display prudence before engage-
ment. During this period, which may only be a
few moments, but may be much longer, cues are
received from our affective states that provide
information and resources for decision making.
Emotions enhance cognitive processes as they
signal where to focus attention (Frijda 1986,
George & Brief 1996), facilitate choice making
(Bagozzi et al. 2003), and help us to select options,
and anticipate situations and their implications
(Damasio 1994). Therefore, we begin our examina-
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tion with emotions, looking to see how they impact
the desire to act in ethical decision making.
Decision making is contingent on both con-
scious and unconscious criteria and may be
influenced by prior emotions experienced during
similar encounters. The somatic marker hypoth-
esis (SMH, Damasio 1994) proposes that affective
somatic states associated with prior decision
outcomes unconsciously serve to guide future
decisions by serving as valuations of the personal
significance of criteria entering the decision
process (see also Hinson et al. 2002). The SMH
suggests that learned affective reactions help
shape choices and simplify decision making.
Damasio and his colleagues have shown how
decision making is influenced by signals that arise
in bioregulatory processes, including those ex-
pressed by emotions. The influence of somatic
markers (signals) can occur at multiple levels of
cognitive and emotional operations and is essen-
tial for establishing motivation. Related to the
SMH is the work by Carver & Scheier (1990,
1998) and Johnson-Laird & Oately (1989), which
describes how emotion is linked with one’s sense
of progress towards desired goals in a cybernetic
system of control. Likewise, as one makes pro-
gress in goal pursuit or fails to do so, emotional
reactions to these outcomes emerge. They occur in
the form of (a) positive affect that functions to
sustain goal thriving and (b) negative affect that
functions to spur one on or discourage one,
depending on specific negative emotional reac-
tions and their intensity and how one copes
with them.
Carver & Scheier’s (1998) research suggests that
when negative emotions are aroused when an
unfavourable outcome is compared with a refer-
ence value, they signal to the individual that
continued engagement in the activity may not lead
to favourable outcomes. Conversely, arousal of
positive emotions when a favourable outcome is
compared with a reference value may signal that
further activity could lead to successful outcomes.
In their model of emotion and performance,
positive feelings are related to high performance
(e.g. doing better than you expect to do) and
negative feelings are related to low performance
(e.g. doing worse than you expect to do) (Carver
et al. 2000). Positive or negative emotional re-
actions to prior outcomes from past choices will
also guide our current responses. To some extent,
then, how we construe our present moment
depends upon emotions previously experienced
as well as currently interpreted. Said differently,
outcomes from emotional processes serve to
colour and shape our feelings and the subjective
experience we presently encounter. In the context
of facing an ethical challenge, such reactions will
thus influence cognitive associations to past events
where similar choices have been made, as well as
to the current situation. Therefore, associations,
cues and subsequent affective arousals will impact
the individual’s decision to proceed in ethical
decision making.
Anticipated emotions, what we expect to feel in
a future situation, may also be influential in
decision making (e.g. Bagozzi et al. 1998, Perugini
& Bagozzi 2001). Analogous to counterfactual
thinking processes, people have been found to
imagine and reflect upon future goal achievement
and goal failure. Gleicher et al. (1995) term such
thought processes as prefactuals. Imagined goal
success leads to positive anticipated emotions (e.g.
pride, hope, joy); imagined goal failure leads to
negative anticipated emotions (e.g. frustration,
disappointment, worry). People are motivated to
approach pleasant outcomes and avoid negative
outcomes. Hence, anticipated emotions serve to
instigate desires to act that are functional
for emotional well-being. Taken together, the
research on anticipated emotions leads us to pro-
pose that there is a relationship between recog-
nition of an ethical challenge and the desire to
act with moral courage, which is mediated by
anticipated emotions. Thus,
Proposition 1a: The greater the felt positive
emotions in anticipation of goal attainment
following imagined performance of acts of moral
courage, the stronger will be the person’s desire to
act with moral courage (see path a in Figure 2).
Proposition 1b: The greater the felt negative
emotions in anticipation of goal failure following
imagined performance of acts of moral courage,
the stronger will be the person’s desire to act with
moral courage (see path a in Figure 2).
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Self-efficacy and outcome expectancies
Along with emotional reactions, self-efficacy and
outcome expectancies are important mental pro-
cesses in the formation of a morally courageous
response. What does the organizational member
sense about their ability to control or have
influence in a moral challenge? The perception
of one’s power to act relies upon a belief that the
individual has some control over the present
circumstances. Picture the organizational member
faced with an ethical challenge. Does the indivi-
dual perceive that they can influence the situation,
that they can make a difference (Christensen &
Kohl 2003)? Self-efficacy (Bandura 1982) has been
linked with outstanding leadership (Bennis &
Nanus 1985), better leadership performance under
stress (Murphy 1992), and is related to work
motivation (Gist & Mitchell 1992). We believe it is
also an important contributor to the desire to act
with moral courage.
Self-efficacy is a psychological state and refers
to one’s confidence that one can perform a specific
behaviour in a particular situation. It thus differs
from the concept of locus of control (e.g. Lefcourt
1992), which is a psychological trait and refers to
a general disposition to act consistently across
multiple situations. Self-efficacy is similar to the
concept of perceived behavioural control,
although the latter is measured with items that
encompass self-efficacy as well as related concepts
(e.g. Ajzen 2002). A closer look at Bandura’s
work reveals that perceptions of efficacy can
enhance or impair motivation and performance in
multiple ways, including the kind of activities
people choose to engage in (1982) and the effort
and persistence exerted to achieve one’s goals
(Bandura & Cervone 1986).
Self-efficacy is relevant to moral courage
because these types of judgements ‘influence not
only what skills people perceive themselves to
have, but also what they believe they can do with
the skills they possess’ (Chemers et al. 2000: 268).
Such beliefs can affect cognitive processes, elicit-
ing either confidence or debilitating self-doubt
(Bandura & Wood 1989). Chemers et al. (2000)
examined dispositional affect and leader-
ship effectiveness and found that self-efficacy is
associated with leadership potential and perfor-
mance. Moreover, self-efficacy may be related to
motivation that may affect levels of perseverance
in the face of difficulty, which would be beneficial
towards stimulating a desire to engage in acts of
moral courage. Building on what we know from
prior research, we propose that the relationship
between recognition of an ethical challenge and
the desire to act is mediated by self-efficacy.
Hence,
Proposition 2a: The greater the felt self-efficacy
towards acts of moral courage, the stronger will
be the person’s desire to act with moral courage
(see path b in Figure 2).
In terms of the decision maker’s experience, self-
efficacy refers to a sense of personal control or
causation in the decision context. But in addition
to self-efficacy, other forces beyond one’s control
can also be influential. Outcome expectancies are
judgements of the likelihood that an action will
lead to a desired goal and take into account events
under, as well as beyond, one’s control. As Carver
& Scheier (1998: 204–205) point out, outcome
expectancies can be more determinative of action
than self-efficacy because they, in a sense, repre-
sent the results of judgements based upon the
effects of personal agency and the effects of forces
outside of one’s personal agency. Interestingly,
people often make judgements to act on the basis
of the likelihood of a desired outcome happening.
As a result, one’s expectations of success and/or
failure can be important determinants of an urge
to act in a way so as to achieve a sought-for goal.
Locke & Latham (1990) recognize the roles of
self-efficacy and outcome expectancies in their
high performance cycle model of a goal-directed
behaviour. We believe this also relates to the
relationship between recognition of an ethical
challenge and the desire to act, mediated by
outcome expectancies. Therefore,
Proposition 2b: The greater the outcome expec-
tancies of success towards acts of moral courage,
the stronger will be the person’s desire to act with
moral courage (see path b in Figure 2).
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Subjective and group norms
Kelman (1974) identified two aspects of social
behaviour tied to norms. One is termed compli-
ance, which refers to the tendency of a person to
yield to interpersonal pressure and is based on the
need for approval. Compliance processes are
similar to the effect of subjective norms (i.e. the
belief that other people whom one respects feel
that one should act), as studied under the theory
of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen 1975) and
the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 1991). In
turn, the bases for felt subjective norms reside in
one’s normative beliefs. Each person responds to
how their significant referents’ feel that they
should act, where this is weighted by one’s
motivation to comply with the expectations of
those referents. The efficacy of subjective norms
has been demonstrated in many contexts, includ-
ing organization research (e.g. Sheppard et al.
1988, Armitage & Conner 2001) and in ethical
decision making (Jones & Verstegen Ryan 1997).
Thus, we propose that the relationship between
recognition of an ethical challenge and the desire
to act is mediated by subjective norms. Therefore,
Proposition 3a: The greater the felt subjective
norms that support acts of moral courage, the
stronger will be the person’s desire to act with
moral courage (see path c in Figure 2).
Group norms (i.e. shared values or goals among
members of a group) are a second aspect of social
behaviour tied to norms (Eagly & Chaiken 1993).
Kelman (1974) termed the processes underlying
group norms, internalization. Here, we learn that
desires or decisions to act are governed by the
congruence of one’s values with the values of co-
members within a group of significance. The self-
regulatory aspects of internalization originate
through socialization processes, whereby stan-
dards of conduct conveyed by significant others
help form self-guides for meeting commonly
accepted idealized goals (Higgins 1991). The
mutuality of group norms finds expression in the
norm of reciprocity (Gouldner 1960), where group
members react in kind to support and receive
benefits provided by co-members. Internalization
processes also lead to feelings of personal or
moral obligation with respect to the welfare of
group members and go beyond returning favours
to include the initiation of beneficial actions on
behalf of the group and its members (Cialdini et
al. 1991, Tyler 1997). Given this understanding,
we propose that the relationship between recogni-
tion of an ethical challenge and the desire to act is
mediated by group norms. As a result,
Proposition 3b: The greater the felt group norms
that support acts of moral courage, the stronger
the person’s desire to act with moral courage (see
path c in Figure 2).
We also see the possibility for group norms to
support an act of moral courage, but not because
they concur with one’s personal desires. For
example, group pressure to act may influence the
person via negative incentives rather than by
strengthening one’s desires. In such cases, morally
courageous actions would unlikely become habit
or practice unless, over time, one’s desires to act
were altered.
Anticipated emotions and outcome expectancies
consider the consequences and likelihood, respec-
tively, of goal achievement and are individual
determinants of decisions. Self-efficacy constitutes
a personal felt power to act. Subjective norms and
group norms address different kinds of social
pressures to act so as to achieve a goal. In our
context of moral courage, the goal in question
might be such instances as to right an injustice, to
choose between conflicting moral principles, or to
ensure human dignity. There is yet another response
that falls outside of the consequences of goal
achievement or pressures to act so as to achieve a
goal. In particular, a person can have an emotional
reaction towards the means needed to achieve a
goal of moral relevance, as we develop below.
Affect towards means
We see affect towards the means as independent
of the judged value of a goal, normative pressure
or self-efficacy per se. To face an ethical challenge
requires one to consider not only to act or not to
act, but also how to act. Some instrumental acts
will be intrinsically enjoyable or lead to pleasant
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consequences. Others may be so noxious or
unpleasant as to lead to avoidance. The felt affect
in response to the consideration of the possible
means supplies additional information to a
decision maker on the personal consequences of
engaging in goal pursuit. Depending on the
polarity and magnitude of emotional reactions
towards the means of goal attainment, a decision
to employ one means or another will be seen
favourably or unfavourably in and of itself.
Affect towards means, to our knowledge, has
not been studied systematically in organization
research. The only two studies we found of
relevance are by Bagozzi et al. (1992) and Bagozzi
& Edwards (2000). The latter study, on health
choices, showed that affect towards means had
main effects (i.e. direct effects) in situations where
impediments to act were weak but interacted with
self-efficacy and outcome expectancies to influ-
ence action (i.e. the effects occurred only when the
three variables combined in a complex manner),
when the impediments to act were strong. Because
we see ethically challenging situations as demand-
ing and posing risk, they induce strong impedi-
ments to act, both internal to the person and
characteristic of the organization context itself.
Therefore, we propose that the effect of an ethical
challenge on the desire to act will be moderated by
one’s affect towards the means, self-efficacy and
outcome expectancies; that is, the effect of an
ethical challenge will vary by the degree of felt
affect towards the means needed to act, one’s self-
confidence that one can perform the means, and
one’s belief that the means will lead to successful
performance of a morally courageous act. In the
language of statistics, these variables combine
jointly and function nonlinearly, as opposed to
the independent, linear effects implied by the
other propositions discussed so far. Thus,
Proposition 4: The desire to act in response to an
ethical challenge will occur to the extent that one
feels positively towards the means of acting, has
confidence that one can act, and believes that
acting will accomplish the desired ends (this
occurs as a combination of B and D through path
d in Figure 2).
Moving from desire to the decision to act
The desire to act in response to an ethical
challenge can be felt in one of two ways.
Philosophers differentiate between appetitive and
volitive desires, where the former is an automatic
response not based on reasoning per se, whereas
the latter is based on deliberative processes (Davis
1984a, b). Apart from the differences in the role of
reasoning between the two types of desire, they
also differ subtly in the way they are expressed.
Synonyms for appetitive desires include craving,
hungering, longing, urge and yearning, whereas
synonyms for volitive desires encompass want,
wish, would like, and covet. The intensity of a
volitive desire will be a direct function of anti-
cipated emotions, self-efficacy, outcome expectan-
cies, subjective norms, group norms and affect
towards the means needed to achieve a goal. The
intensity for our appetitive desire is based on
internalized factors, which are often biological;
the role of anticipated emotions, self-efficacy,
outcome expectancies, subjective norms, group
norms, and affect towards means is to free up
such latent desires.
Sometimes a desire to act, however arrived
upon, will directly lead to a decision to act. This
constitutes a deterministic outcome of desire. This
deterministic path (see path e in Figure 2)
influencing a decision to act occurs when primitive
habits, urges, compulsion or impulsivity operate
unchecked. This can occur when self-regulation is
absent or thwarted, or when first-order desires go
unchecked deterministically. In some areas of
social psychology, the decision to act is termed an
intention to act (e.g. Fishbein & Ajzen 1975) or an
implementation intention (e.g. Gollwitzer 1993).
The need to differentiate between the desire to act
and the decision to act arises from the dissociation
of a desire from an intention or commitment to
act (Perugini & Bagozzi 2004). The direct link
between desire and the decision to act can be
thought of as either a habitual or compulsive
pathway. This path can be activated straight-
away, depending on either the degree of one’s
prior learning in classical conditioning, operant
learning or cognitive learning senses. In all of
these cases, the effect is deterministic. Thus,
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Proposition 5: A direct path from desire to the
decision to act with moral courage will occur
when individuals act in a predetermined manner
(see path e in Figure 2).
In contrast to a direct, deterministic path from
desire to decision, a person can self-regulate the
influence of desires on decision making in one of
two ways. The automatic self-regulation of desires
to act (see path f in Figure 2) occurs as a
consequence of a behavioural orientation learned
developmentally and often early in life (e.g.
Kochanska 1994, Posner & Rothbart 2000) and
is manifest in certain values, traits or virtues. The
conscious self-regulation of desire (see path g
in Figure 2) occurs through the wilful application
of personal standards to one’s felt (first-order)
desire and is an example of a second-order desire
governing one’s first-order desire. We now explain
the differences and impact of automatic and con-
scious influencers that moderate the effect of a
first-order desire to act on the decision to act with
moral courage.
Self-regulation as a value, trait or virtue
Personal values can function as automatic self-
regulatory mechanisms similar to the role of
traits. These internal, pre-established guidelines
help direct our responses to situations. Personal
values, implicit and explicit, are inherent in our
choices and behaviours, and vary depending upon
the person and situation (Konrad 1982). Family
and peer influence, religious values and personal
needs help shape each person and can contribute
to how they will act when faced with an ethical
challenge in the workplace (Barry 1985). Indeed,
research shows that personal values influence
moral behaviour (Gautschi 1977, DiBattista
1989). For example, individual difference vari-
ables, such as economic value orientation and
Machiavellianism, can be positively related to un-
ethical behaviour (Hegarty & Sim 1979). In other
words, our predispositions to behave ethically or
unethically are strong predictors of our ethical
behaviour. This suggests that we carry with us a
preconditioned set of values towards ethical
behaviour, which plays an important role that
helps to guide decision making. The standards
that reside within our moral fibre, as Rokeach
(1973) labels personal values, may prove useful in
understanding and explaining sensitivity to the
ethical dimensions of organizational life (Payne &
Giacalone 1990).
To understand how values, and even virtues,
can become habits of choice, let us return to
moral courage in the Aristotelian sense (1999:
NE 1103a20), as motivated by a desire to do the
right thing:
Excellence is an art won by training and habitua-
tion. We do not act rightly because we have virtue
or excellence, but rather we have those because we
have acted rightly. We are what we repeatedly do.
Excellence, then, is not an act but a habit.
A modern analogy comes from sportswear maker
Nike who, during the initial jogging craze in the
1980s, used the phrase just do it. To build primary
demand and gain commercial appeal for con-
sumers to engage in regular exercise, they applied
Aristotle’s philosophy towards the ethics of good
health. That is, they attempted to change beha-
viour and to make jogging a daily moral choice.
In order for moral courage to become a habit
of choice, self-regulation must take centre stage
to overcome inertia to do nothing, resist temp-
tations, and overcome impediments to action.
Living effectively requires that individuals restrain
certain impulses and desires, while channeling
others in the pursuit of valued goals (Bagozzi
2003).
Self-regulation is described by psychologists as
efforts made by an individual to change their
response to a given situation (Bandura 1991). So
important is this function that Baumeister &
Exline (1999) proposed that self-regulation might
be the master virtue, inasmuch as virtues entail
overcoming selfish impulses for the sake of the
collective. According to Baumeister & Vohs
(2004), self-regulation is the effort made by an
individual to initiate or change responses to a
given situation. Responses that may be regulated
are thoughts, feelings and desires. Self-control is
one’s ability to alter one’s own states and
responses. Hence, this function is both key to
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adaptive success and central to virtuous beha-
viour, especially if the latter requires setting aside
the pursuit of selfish goals (cf. Baumeister &
Exline 2000).
We also frame and address self-regulation as it
originates in personal values and influential
personal traits. In an ideal scenario, an individual
self-regulates in the course of their decision
making automatically – by nature. If exercised
regularly over time, personal values (in instru-
mental and end-state senses) can become second
nature to us, evolving into or becoming ingrained
as character traits (Rokeach 1973). Personal
values are guiding principles in one’s life. We
believe that if individuals exercise self-regulation
regularly, in time they can influence their natural
reactions to a situation from being less to more
inclined to act in morally courageous ways. The
reference to self-regulation as a moral muscle
(Baumeister & Exline 2000) implies that it can
strengthen with use. While these factors may be
more established for some organizational mem-
bers than others, we see the potential for further
development in most people. Hence, the tendency
or likelihood to act in a morally courageous way
may be promoted or influenced by increasing the
awareness and value of emotional awareness and
self-regulation. Moreover, it should be mentioned
that personal values (in instrumental and end-
state senses) arise through developmental and
socialization processes and are often exercised as a
response to explicit social influence (Schwartz
1996). They motivate behaviour and justify past
action. Taken together, we see that the operation
of personal values as automatic self-regulation
may have the potential to moderate the effect of
the desire to act on the decision to act. That is, to
the extent that a person has acquired personal
values, traits and virtues to act with moral
courage, these individual difference variables can
augment or attenuate the influence that a desire to
act has on one’s decision to so act, depending on
whether the value, trait or virtue is consonant or
dissonant with the desire. Thus,
Proposition 6: Automatic self-regulation, in the
form of personal values, traits and virtues will
moderate the relationship between desire and the
decision to act with moral courage (see path g in
Figure 2).
Whereas we considered self-regulation so far as a
value, trait or virtue, suggesting that its effects are
largely unconscious and automatic, we now turn
to self-regulation as a conscious or controlled way
that decision makers transform desires into
decisions to act.
Conscious self-regulation
Central to moral courage may be our ability to
respond to and/or alter our emotional and
motivational states. That is, we need certain
competencies to keep our emotions and motives
in perspective, relative to others (Salovey et al.
1993, Feldman Barrett & Gross 2001). We argue
that people, who are aware of their emotions and
motives and use them effectively, impose self-
regulation to their advantage. To facilitate moral
courage our emotions and motives must inform
but not overwhelm. Building on Baumeister’s self-
regulation theory, emotional and motivational
awareness coupled with self-control can be used
to guide one’s choices via incorporation of long-
range considerations in decision making. To
consider a more systemic view over time, one
must keep track of one’s emotional and motiva-
tional behaviour in the light of the present
circumstances. We see that emotional and moti-
vational awareness and the use of emotions and
motives, practised alongside self-regulation, are
important in responding to an ethical challenge.
Ideas formulated by the philosopher Frankfurt
(1971, 1988) help us to explain how self-regulation
and desires may work together to moderate (i.e.
either attenuate or augment) the relationship
between the desire to act and the decision to
act with moral courage. Frankfurt suggested
that people have the capacity for reflective self-
evaluation in that they can become aware of
their motives, feelings, thoughts and desires. He
proposed that everyone, to different degrees, has
the capacity to evaluate their desires and decide
whether they want (or do not want) to have
these personal desires as they scrutinize them.
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Frankfurt termed these mental events second-
order desires. We retain this naming convention,
but construe second-order desires in a somewhat
different and fuller way than he originally
proposed (Bagozzi 2006). We suggest that a
decision maker can come to reflect upon a felt
(first-order) desire to act in such a way as to
cancel, override or postpone further consideration
or implementation of the desire to act.
More specifically, we propose that when think-
ing about one’s (first-order) desire to act, one asks
oneself such questions as, Am I the kind of person
who should have such a desire? Am I the kind of
person who acts on this kind of desire? Is the
desire I feel consistent with the kind of person I
ought or wish to be? Will acting on this desire lead
to personal flourishing? and What effect will
acting on this desire have on other people
important to me, other people whom I may not
even know, or society writ large? In a parallel
manner, we propose that a decision maker can, in
an ethically challenging situation, reflect upon his/
her lack of felt (first-order) desire to act. Here, the
person considers whether to embrace, accept or
construct a desire to act, and questions analogous
to those noted above may be posed self-reflec-
tively (e.g. Is my not feeling a desire to act
consistent with the type of person I wish to be?).
Given our considerations of self-reflectivity, we
frame such expectations as second-order desires
and hypothesize that they will moderate (i.e.
attenuate or augment) the effect of the first-order
desire to act on the decision to act. Hence,
Proposition 7: Conscious self-regulation, in the
form of second-order desires, will moderate the
relationship between first-order desires and the
decision to act with moral courage (see path g in
Figure 2).
An additional consideration, not given much
attention by Frankfurt, is the question of how
second-order desires arise in the first place. Based
on recent developments made by emotion psy-
chologists and organizational researchers, we
suggest that second-order desires develop and
are influenced by two processes, self-conscious
emotions and social identity, as developed below.
Self-conscious emotions and social
identity
First, self-conscious emotions serve to shape
second-order desires. From a young age, people
are socialized to different degrees to feel such self-
conscious emotions as empathy, pride, guilt,
shame, embarrassment, envy and jealousy (Tang-
ney & Fischer 1995, Lewis 2000, Tangney 2003).
Thus, when confronted with an opportunity and
desire to act, a decision maker will find that one or
more self-conscious emotions will be activated,
depending on the nature of previous develop-
mental experiences and one’s history of coping
with these emotions. Self-conscious emotions
have personal and social connotations and bring
a person experiencing them to consider the self as
object and self as agent (Barret 1995). Second-
order desires are directly dependent on self-
conscious emotions. For example, in the case of
pride, this emotion helps to maintain self-esteem,
signal to oneself important standards, and facil-
itate the acquisition of information about the self
as object and agent. Pride also shows others that
one has achieved valued outcomes, and it
promotes competitive motives. Of course, pride
must be self-managed in social settings, lest it lead
to hubris with negative social consequences
(Lewis 2000: 630). The important point for our
model of moral courage is that second-order
desires respond to the personal and social
standards for conduct entailed by positive and
negative self-conscious emotions.
Note also that the role of self-conscious
emotions that we propose here has some affinity
to that proposed in Confucian thought where
‘impulsions towards action’ are universal tenden-
cies manifest in the virtues of ren (compassion,
goodness or benevolence), yi (righteousness,
appropriateness), li (proper behaviour, ritual
propriety or good manners), zhi (knowledge or
sense of right and wrong) and de virtue (power of
moral example) (Richards 1932: 67, Cua 2003).
However, the Confucian interpretation of the will
in this sense is closer to what we term automatic
self-regulation, rather than conscious self-regula-
tion via second-order desires. Self-conscious
emotion can thus be seen to play a role in the
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operation of both forms of self-regulation pro-
posed herein.
Another factor that shapes and constrains
second-order desires is social identity (Ashford
& Mael 1989, Ellemers et al. 1999, Bergami &
Bagozzi 2000, Dutton et al. 1994). Membership in
a group or organization can promote certain
values or standards that might be used as criteria
in the application of second-order desires. Social
identity entails self-awareness of group member-
ship, feelings of attachment and belongingness to
the group, and evaluative connotations that one is
an important and valued member of the group. As
social identity grows, one becomes depersonalized
and group or organization standards become
paramount. To the extent that the organization
can instill standards that promote resolution of
ethical challenges, it can help to shape second-
order desires of group members in ways useful for
the regulation of desires to act with moral
courage. Conscious self-regulation, as influenced
by second-order desires, are influential in moving
from the desire to the decision to act with moral
courage. Thus, we expect the following:
Proposition 8a: Social or self-conscious emotions
promote, support or activate second-order desires
to act with moral courage and thereby indirectly
(through second-order desires) moderate the
effect of first-order desires on the decision to
act with moral courage (see path h in Figure 2).
Proposition 8b: Social identity promotes, sup-
ports or activates second-order desires to act with
moral courage and thereby indirectly (through
second-order desires) moderates the effect of
first-order desires on the decision to act with
moral courage (see path i in Figure 2).
Weakness-of-will
An important overarching issue to consider is the
relationship of weakness-of-will (i.e. akrasia) to
moral courage (e.g. Rorty 1980, Mele 1987,
Charlton 1988, Gosling 1990). Two general forms
of weakness-of-will might be identified, depending
on whether one considers the failure to avoid
doing evil behaviour or to promote doing good
behaviour. Charlton (1988: 31) captures impor-
tant aspects of the former as follows:
. . . akrasia is not merely desiring what we think
bad; it is not even simply doing what we think bad:
it is doing what we think bad of our own free will,
and that is generally taken to involve being able
to refrain.
The notion of akrasia is a longstanding, difficult
topic for consideration, and we simply point out
two places where it occurs in our framework (i.e.
after and before one has made a decision to act;
see Figure 2) and what generally must be done to
overcome its influence.
By far, the most numerous treatments of
akrasia in the literature deal with the failure to
act. One instance of the failure to act concerns the
inability to implement a decision one has made to
act. Between the point in time when one decides to
act in a morally courageous manner and would so
act, a number of things may conspire to thwart
action enactment. Except perhaps in situations
where one acts straightaway in an automatic-like
manner, following the formation of a decision to
act, a variety of external and internal events can
intervene between the decision and hoped-for
action. For example, a physical impediment might
arise to prevent the realization of a planned
action. Or perhaps temptation might vie for one’s
attention and entice one to act in ways contrary to
one’s original purposes. Unexpected contingencies
might serve to confound one’s efforts. Likewise,
internal impediments might emerge such as fear of
failure, lack of confidence in the performance or
efficacy of the means needed to achieve a goal, or
second thoughts about earlier conclusions, and
commitments made before the decision to act.
Many additional decisions and commitments
must typically be made after a decision to act
emerges: for example, mustering the wherewithal
to plan and try to act, monitoring progress as one
pursues a goal, making needed adjustments in
goal striving, maintaining one’s commitment and
resolve to act as one begins to do so, etc. The
performance of a final action or the instantiation
of an instrumental behaviour directed at goal
attainment can break down. Self-regulatory
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mental and physical behaviours are obviously
needed in such cases (see path j in Figure 2).
Automatic self-regulation might also function in
such a case as well (see path k in Figure 2).
Three other kinds of weakness-of-will have
received much less attention in the literature and
occur before one makes a decision to act or not to
act. Our framework (see Figure 2) seems particu-
larly relevant for pointing out three key issues at
hand. The first concerns the case where one is
aware of a desire to do evil. To prevent such a
desire from coming to fruition, at least two
aspects of self-regulation must be manifested. A
decision-maker must know what, from the point
of view of his/her personal standards, is the right
thing to do. Secondly, he/she must be committed
to doing the right thing, which in this case is to
decide not to do evil. A second case concerns
awareness that an action is possible in the face of
a moral challenge but that one does not, at the
moment, have a desire to act in this regard. For
morally courageous action to ensue, a second-
order desire must arise consisting of knowing
what is the right thing one should do, in the light
of one’s personal standards, and being committed
to doing what is right. In addition, the decision-
maker must believe that an efficacious way exists
for him/her to act and he/she has the ability to so
act and no overwhelming obstacles can be
discerned. A third and final case is the one where
the individual has a first-order desire to act in
response to a moral challenge in a morally
courageous way. At this point, self-regulation, in
the sense of reflection and appraisal on whether
one is the kind of person who acts (or should act)
in accordance with the felt desire, leads one to
decide (or not to decide) to act in concert with
that desire to the extent that one holds the
requisite personal standards of conduct and is
committed to them.
Of course, in all operations of second-order
desires any tension between what one feels he or
she should (or should not) do, and the felt desire
or lack of desire to act must be wilfully resolved,
and here is where weakness-of-will plays out.
What our framework adds to classic treatments of
weakness-of-will is the specification of a decision
rule, the general type of content for the rule (i.e.
personal standards), and the origins of constrain-
ing factors on the content, which are grounded in
the specific personal (self-conscious emotions) and
social forces (social identity) one is exposed to
throughout life.
Conclusion
Our goal was to suggest that acting in a morally
courageous way is subject to self-regulation and
thus may become more common than implied by
popular discourse. To do so, we considered
factors that influence the desire and decision to
act with moral courage, when organizational
members are faced with an ethical challenge.
We described how affect is integrated in the
decision-making process when proceeding to-
wards an act of moral courage. This functions
through multiple stages via anticipated emotions,
affect towards means, desires to act, felt self-
conscious emotions and attachment to a group.
We explained how initial movement towards
morally courageous decision making is also
affected by cognitive information processing in
the form of self-efficacy, outcome expectancies,
and interpersonal and group norms. Moreover,
we suggested that social forces shape decisions to
act with moral courage, as a function of subjective
norms, group norms and social identity.
The model we present depicts how the transi-
tion from the desire to a decision to act occurs
broadly in one of three ways. A deterministic path
(see path e in Figure 2) to a decision to act occurs
when desire in the form of primitive habits, urges,
compulsion or impulsivity operate unchecked.
This can occur when self-regulation is absent or
thwarted when first-order desire impetuses go
unchecked deterministically. This may happen
when one’s moral standards are lacking or are at
early stages of moral development. An automatic
regulation of a first-order desire operates when
dispositional values, traits or virtues attenuate or
augment the force of a first-order desire (see path f
in Figure 2). A second self-regulatory path (see
path g in Figure 2) functions when a decision
maker self-reflectively considers a first-order
desire to act and appraises whether it is consistent
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with personal standards and the need for moral
excellence. We suggest that these decisions are
where individual will and the willingness to act
rightly are either elevated to sustain momentum
towards action or curtailed. Engaging in an act of
moral courage means at times doing what one
knows one ought to do regardless of threat or
cost. This is, in part, why self-regulation is an
essential ingredient in ethical decision making.
While our purpose has been to identify auto-
matic and wilful determinants of the desire and
decision to act with moral courage, we would be
remiss if we did not underscore that the ultimate
goal is to engage in moral action. Regardless of
whether this final outcome is to take action or not
(no action may be the right course of action in
some cases), we acknowledge that desire and
decision alone are insufficient. As Aristotle
informed us, moral courage is not only knowing
what to do, but it is also about acting accordingly
(1999: NE 7.10.1152a; 7.11.1152b). Our intention
has been to show how movement towards the act
can be supported by factors en route to a final
actuation. Because our approach implies that
when people deal with their desires, this will be
accompanied by a series of potentially courage-
involving choice points, our view complements
Rorty’s (1980, 1986), in that the process calls for a
series of acts of self-regulation, self-evaluation
and execution of wilful acts.
The multiple points of self-reflection, self-
evaluation and self-regulation that the individual
faces along the way to action are like ‘little mental
acts’ of moral courage throughout the decision-
making path. We see these inner process actions
as aids in helping a person move forward,
culminating in the overt demonstration of moral
action. As Rorty (1980) describes the complex
structure of this process, one’s greatest exposure
to failure can be at any point because of weakness
of will. Indeed, individuals are vulnerable as they
move from one stage to the next. Although the
external behavioural action is the final and
perhaps most visible outcome, our concern has
been to consider the more granular features: the
internal mental decision points and actions that
influence this impressionable path. Our work has
highlighted some of these influences that each
person must address throughout the process, in
order to achieve the desired end state: morally
courageous action.
The model and propositions presented in this
study serve as a platform for future research and
education for managers and leaders. We went
beyond current frameworks by drawing upon
contemporary ideas from philosophy, psychology
and organization research to describe how affect
and cognitions work together with individual and
social forces to influence moral courage in the
workplace. However, empirical work is needed to
test the propositions proposed in this study.
Extended study will give educators insights on
how to help organizational members learn how to
be more aware of their emotions, automatic action
tendencies, and the role that second-order desires
play in ethical decision making. Ultimately, it is
through the functioning second-order desires or the
acquisition of virtues that decision makers self-
regulate their actions and perform morally coura-
geous behaviours. Advancements in scholarship in
this area will ultimately help workers prepare for
exercising moral behaviour in multiple contexts,
including helping managers to design jobs and
create programmes to better prepare employees for
everyday and unplanned ethical challenges.
The framework we have provided is germane for
managers and leaders who not only face ethical
challenges themselves, but who are also respon-
sible for managing people who experience ethical
challenges. Moreover, it is relevant for those who
are responsible for designing organizations to
more effectively foster moral action throughout
the course of members’ daily worklife activities.
Understanding the mechanisms for engagement
will instigate learning, and is important for
understanding how members’ varying emotions,
dispositions and values may come into conflict.
We take heed from scholars who study courage
in the workplace, presenting the concern that
programmes to enhance exemplary moral conduct
may inadvertently lend credence to extreme
actions that can inflict larger and lasting damage
(Harris 1999). Fearlessness and overconfidence
that verge on rashness are most certainly undesir-
able. Therefore, the assumption that courage is
good for its own sake can be erroneous. Without
Business Ethics: A European Review
Volume 16 Number 2 April 2007
r 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation r 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 145
appropriate care, morally courageous actions may
inadvertently tip to excess, thus missing the mark
of Aristotle’s mean (1999: NE 2.7.1107b). Hence,
future research must address the development of
moral courage in the workplace, focusing on how
to instill balanced habituation and practice in
daily worklife activities. As Miller suggests,
‘Moral courage is one of those things that can
only be properly attained by doing it. To get
courage, be courageous’ (2005: 26).
While expectations for ethical and moral
behaviour continue to be pronounced by organi-
zational leaders, little has been offered by way of
helping people understand how to engage in it.
This is particularly difficult when organizational
norms and processes are not congruent with
moral action. Therefore, we must encourage
scholars, leaders and practitioners to examine
incongruence between organizational values,
performance expectations, work processes and
demands for professional ethics. In conclusion,
this work highlighted factors that help us better
understand why people act or do not act in
morally courageous ways, but more work is
needed to ascertain how work environments
should be designed and what managers and
workers should do to facilitate the performance
of morally courageous actions.
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